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Abstract
The current paper investigates to which extent students in higher education respond to
￿nancial incentives by adjusting their study behavior. Students in Norway who completed
certain graduate study programs between 1991 and 1995 on stipulated time were entitled to
a restitution (of approximately 3,000 USD) from the Norwegian State Educational Loan
Fund. Using a di￿erence-in-di￿erence approach, we ￿nd that the fraction of students
graduating on time during the reform period increased by 10 percent, relative to a base
probability of about 25 percent. The estimated e￿ect for fully treated students (students
who were aware of the reform from the start of their studies) is much higher, at 50 percent.
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11 Introduction
Education at all levels is often believed to be associated with positive externalities. Because of
this, and in order to allow for equality of opportunity, education is subsidized in many countries.
This is the case wherever students do not pay the full cost of their instructions through tuition.
Several countries have even stronger subsidies, in that students’ living expenses are also partly
covered, either through scholarships or government loan agencies.
From human capital theory, we would expect subsidies to increase return to education and
also help o￿setting credit-constrained students. However, the presence of subsidies to education
may not only increase the choice of attainment level in the higher education system, but may
also in￿uence the level of e￿ort provided by students: As students are generally subsidized for
each unit of time studying, and not for the degree attained, there may be incentives to spend too
much time in the educational system (see among others Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull, (1999)).
This may be particularly important if the consumption value, i.e. private, non-pecuniary return
to education, is a dominant factor behind the students’ study duration choice (Alstads￿ter and
Sivertsen, 2010; Zafar, 2009). In this case, if students are credit-constrained, increases in income
support may ￿nance increased consumption of education services, with little externalities.
It is indeed observed that many students in universities and college programs around the
world do not complete their university/college degree on time. According to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education (2003), ￿rst-time recipients of bachelor’s degrees between 1999 and 2000
spent on average 10 extra months beyond estimated completion time. Similar patterns are also
documented for many European countries (Brunello and Winter-Ebmer, 2003). This together
with the belief that students do not exert su￿cient study e￿ort, has increased the interest in
whether students react to ￿nancial incentives. The evidence in this area is however mixed and
still limited.
By using rich data from the administrative registers of Statistics Norway, the aim of the
current paper is to investigate the e￿ects on study duration of a reform that rewarded students
who completed their higher education degree on nominal time. The reform made students in
Norway who completed certain graduate study programs between the autumn semester 1991
and the autumn semester 1995 entitled to a restitution of approximately 18,000 NOK (about
3000 USD and 34 percent of the yearly loan sum) from the Norwegian State Educational Loan
2Fund if they ￿nished the program on stipulated time. This reform focused on the intensive
margin, explicitly aiming to induce students to improve the e￿ciency in higher education.
Earlier reforms have been concerned with the design of students support system (loans and
grants) related to the extensive margin, such as increasing enrollment and access to higher
education by providing a subsidy to all students independent of performance.
The reform creates sharp discontinuities in the ￿nancial incentives that the 1991 to 1995
graduation cohorts face compared to the previous and subsequent cohorts. These discontinuities
can be exploited to estimate the impact of the ￿nancial reward on study duration. Like all
research designs that depend on a reform, there is the potential threat of confounding time
e￿ects. However, the fact that some education programs were not eligible for the restitution
provides an additional comparison group that will allow a di￿erence-in-di￿erences approach
that can correct for such confounding time e￿ects. Our results suggest that the reform had
quite strong e￿ect on students’ time to degree.
This paper contributes to the literature by being one of the few papers addressing the
causal e￿ect of ￿nancial incentives on study duration among students at the university level.
Moreover, it includes the whole student population in Norwegian higher education institutions.
Previous papers with a credible research design have typically only focused on students from
one particular ￿eld of study or university.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature
on study duration in higher education. Section 3 provides some background on the higher
education system and the student support system in Norway. Section 4 outlines the empirical
strategy whereas section 5 presents the ￿ndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The empirical literature on study duration in higher education is in brief twofold: (i) It focuses
on the relationship between student aid and the demand side of higher education, i.e. the
extensive margin and how ￿nancial subsidies can increase enrollment and investment in higher
education, and (ii) how to improve the e￿ciency and e￿ectiveness of higher education pro-
duction by giving students ￿nancial incentives related to nominal study duration or academic
performance.
3Governments’ student loans and grants make it easier for students to obtain a post-secondary
education. Many studies have been conducted in order to measure the e￿ect of these systems.
For instance, Dynarski (2003) ￿nds that the college attendance dropped by more than a third,
and schooling by two-thirds of a year after a shift in the ￿nancial aid policy in the United States
when the Congress in 1992 eliminated the Social Security student bene￿t program. Dynarski
(2004) also studies the e￿ect of scholarships in the United States. Scholarships enable students
to participate in the educational attainment process and whereas traditional scholarships often
are eligible for A-levels student, new merit aid programs in the United States require relatively
modest academic credentials. Dynarski (2004) provides evidence that most of these merit aid
programs have closed racial and ethnic gaps in attendance. Skyt-Nielsen, Słrensen and Taber
(2010) investigate the change in demand for college due to changes in student aid arising from
a Danish reform. Their ￿ndings indicate that enrollment increases with higher subsidies, but
that enrollment is less responsive than in other studies and countries. They argue that one
reason for this may be that large subsidies are already in place in Denmark. The presence of
borrowing constraints seems also only to deter college enrollment to a minor extent.
More recently, the potential of ￿nancial incentives to increase the study duration and per-
formance among students has attracted attention. Financial incentives may be implemented
either through direct money incentives, variation in tuition fees or restitution of student loans
depending on academic results, or in our case the time to degree. The literature in this domain
is however relatively small and scattered, and a lot of it relates to compulsory education (e.g.
Kremer, Miguel and Thornton, 2005; Angrist and Lavy, 2009).
Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van der Klaauw (2010) implement a randomized experiment among
￿rst year economic students in Amsterdam where students who passed all ￿rst year requirements
on time could earn a reward of 750 Euros. They ￿nd that this increased performance for higher
ability students, but they also ￿nd negative impacts for less able students. Using a regression
discontinuity design on data from Bocconi University in Italy, Garibaldi, Giavazzi, Ichino and
Rettore (2007) show that if tuition in the last year of the program is raised by 1,000 Euros the
probability of late graduation decreases by 6.1 percentage points with respect to a benchmark
average probability of 80 percent. Common for these two latter studies is that they only use
data for one particular university or ￿eld of study.
4More in line with our study, H￿kkinen and Uusitalo (2003) evaluate the e￿ect of a student
aid reform in Finland that was intended to shorten the duration of university studies. The
reform relied on a new system where the old loan-based student aid system was replaced with
a system of grants. The reform had only modest e￿ect, and this e￿ect was limited to ￿elds
with relative long durations. Furthermore, most of the decline in the observed time to degree
can be explained by an increase in the unemployment rate that reduced student employment
opportunities. In the same spirit, Heineck, Kifmann and Lorenz (2006) apply a duration analysis
to examine the e￿ects on study duration of an additional tuition fee for students enrolled in
university programs (in Germany) beyond the regular completion time. Their ￿ndings are
however ambiguous. The fact that both H￿kkinen and Uusitalo and Heineck et al. cannot fully
control for confounding time factors as they only compare students before and after the reform,
distinguish our study from theirs.
There is also some evidence that observed excess time to graduation may be explained by
labor market variables (such as wage di￿erentials and employment protection) and attributes of
the funding scheme of tertiary education. Brunello and Winter-Ebmer (2002) ￿nd, by building
on data from European countries, that an unappealing consequence of wage compression is that
it might reduce the incentives to complete college in time, and that excess time to graduation
is signi￿cantly higher in countries with stricter employment protection. Bound, Lovenheim
and Turner (2007) provide evidence that increased strati￿cation in U.S higher education and
reduction in collegiate resources outside the top-tier of institutions are the main explanations
for the observed increase in time to degree.
53 Institutional settings and data
3.1 Higher education in Norway and the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund
The Norwegian higher education sector is almost completely dominated by public institutions,
with 85 percent of the students. Tuition is virtually nonexistent, making the direct costs
of higher education very low.1 There are three di￿erent types of institutions: universities,
specialized university colleges and regional university colleges. All types o￿er courses both at
the undergraduate and graduate level. During the 1990s undergraduate courses lasted up to
four years, while most graduate courses had a total duration of ￿ve to six years. The universities
o￿ered both integrated ￿ve- or six-year courses, leading to a graduate degree (e.g. medicine,
theological seminar and civil engineering) and shorter courses in di￿erent ￿elds that could be
combined to an undergraduate degree of three and a half or four years duration. Students
with a relevant undergraduate degree can be admitted to graduate courses of one and a half
or two years duration, such that the total stipulated duration of these degrees, including the
undergraduate degrees, is ￿ve or six years. Students in specialized university colleges mostly
study four- to six-year courses in specialized ￿elds, such as business, architecture and veterinary
science. Most students at regional colleges study two- or three-year professionally oriented
courses (e.g. nursing, teaching, engineering and commerce). 2
To further promote equality of opportunity, irrespective of family background, The Norwe-
gian State Educational Loan Fund o￿ers favorable loans which are meant to cover the students’
costs of living such as housing and food during the study period. 3 There are several reasons why
this loan is favorable. While studying, no interest is calculated and no repayment is required
until the student has completed his/her education and (hopefully) entered the labor market.
Also, the loan may be fully or partially waived if the student for one or another reason does
not have su￿cient income after completing his/her education. In the case of death, the loan is
1The single important exception from this is a private business school with about 10 percent of the students,
and which does charge signi￿cant tuition fees.
2From 2003, following the Bologna process, most educations have been streamlined into three-year Bachelor
degrees and ￿ve-year Master degrees. Master degrees are organized either as a two-year course taken after
completing a Bachelor degree, or a ￿ve-year integrated course. There is still a range of shorter courses, and some
professional degrees of six years durations. The formal distinction between specialized and regional university
colleges is recent, but re￿ects a di￿erence which was present also during the 1990s. Also, since 2005 the number
of universities have increased from four to eight through the conversion of one specialized university institutions
and three regional university colleges.
3Note that also foreign students studying in Norway and Norwegian students abroad may bene￿t from the
the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund.
6erased.
The Norwegian Parliament decides every year how much money to assign to the students
the subsequent school year, generally adjusting this amount to keep up with students’ costs of
living. This sum, which amounted to 54,000 NOK (about 9,000 USD) for the academic year
1991/1992 (about 42,000 NOK of this sum was loan, and the remaining 12,000 NOK grant), 4
is the same for all students, and not a￿ected by parental income. On the other hand, ￿nancial
support has for a long time been need-based on the students’ own income.
As the grant and interest bene￿t represent ￿free money￿ to the students, we expect a high
take-up rate. Consistent with this, the fraction of students in higher education who take up
loans is close to 100 percent.5 The average loan amount per student was approximately 155,000
NOK for students completing higher education in 1994.
3.2 The ￿turbo￿ reform
Students in Norway who completed certain higher education programs between the autumn
1990 and the autumn 1995 were entitled to a restitution from the Norwegian State Educational
Loan fund if they graduated on stipulated time. The restitution was approximately 18 000
NOK (about 3000 USD and 35 percent of the yearly ￿nancial support). The reform was made
public July 1991. This implies that students graduating on stipulated time the autumn 1990
and spring 1991 bene￿ted from the new incentive scheme, without being aware of it. Only
students graduating the subsequent years (the academic year 1991/92 and onwards), got the
chance to adapt their behavior according to the intention of the reform. Consequently, we will
denote the period from the autumn 1991 to the autumn 1995 as the treatment period.
This reform creates sharp discontinuities in the ￿nancial incentives that the autumn 1991-
autumn 1995 graduation cohorts face compared to previous and subsequent cohorts. We will
exploit these discontinuities to estimate the impact of ￿nancial reward on study duration.
The nice feature of the reform was that some education programs were not eligible for the
restitution (see more below). This provides an additional comparison group that can be used
4Source: This ￿gure and following ￿gures concerning loans and grants are taken from the webpages of the
Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund, http://www.lanekassen.no/, unless stated otherwise.
5Berg (1997) reports that 97 percent of students graduating with a higher degree get support from the
Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund at some time.
7in a di￿erence-in-di￿erence approach which correct for confounding time e￿ects.
Although the reform was abolished the spring 1996, 6 the The Norwegian Ministry of Edu-
cation suggested already in 1993/94 to terminate it. The reasons for this was the fear that the
reform favored students not in need of a subsidy. It was also some doubt that the reform had
any e￿ects.7
3.3 Data
We use register data from Statistics Norway consisting of all students enrolled in Norwegian
higher education institutions who graduated between 1988 and 1998. For each student we have
information on which education program they were enrolled in, the length of the education pro-
gram, start and stop dates and whether the students completed their studies on the stipulated
time. The data is reported directly from the educational institutions to Statistics Norway, and
are thus considered to be very accurate. We also have background characteristics such as the
student’s age, gender, immigrant status and parental education.
Students who were younger than 18 and older than 21 when graduating from high school
(about 17 percent of the sample) 8 and students who enrolled in education programs after the
reform was terminated are dropped from the sample. Some programs do not have a clear
reform status, either because it is not clear from the regulations whether it does qualify for a
restitution, or because the reform status changes during the reform period. We exclude students
enrolled in these programs.9 The total number of students in our sample is 26,871.
Table 1 shows how these students are distributed across the di￿erent education programs.
The education programs a￿ected by the reform (henceforth treatment group) mostly consists of
students enrolled in humanities, social sciences, science and law, while medicine and agronomy
dominate the groups which was not a￿ected by the reform (henceforth control group). A
majority of the students in the treatment groups is enrolled in 12 semester programs (i.e. 6
6See White Paper number 14 (1993-94).
7From 1988 to 2003 students that opted for all longer study programs - 10 to 13 semesters, - were entitled to
another restitution that was not linked to time to degree but only completion. The restitution was increasing
in the length of the study program, ranging from around 19 000 for 10 semester programs to 46 000 for 13
semester programs. However, as this reform a￿ected both students in the control and treatment groups equally
much, we do not consider this to bias our di￿erence-in-di￿erence estimate.
8About 75 percent of these are dropped due to missing information on birth date.
9This amounts to 45 percent of the students in our sample. Almost 60 percent of this number is students
studying civil engineering. Education programs in civil engineering became eligible for restitution at a later time
than other courses. The second and third largest groups, totalling about 34 percent of the excluded students,
are two groups of unspeci￿ed higher educations.
8Table 1: Distribution of students across the di￿erent education programs
Length of ed program Nr of Percent
(# semesters) students
Treatment group
Humanities (cand.philo) 12 3,190 15.32
Social sciences (cand.poli) 12 3,549 17.04
Science (cand.scient) 11 5,811 27.90
Law (cand.jur) 12 5,570 26.74
Arts (music) (cand.musicae) 12 94 0.45
Theological seminar (cand.theol) 12 517 2.48
Economics (cand.oecon) 11 462 2,22
Psychology (cand.psychol) 13 932 4.47
Dentistry (cand.odont) 10 702 3,37
N 20,827 100
Control group
Medicine (cand.med) 12 2,810 46.49
Agronomy (cand.agric) 10 2,337 38.67
Pharmaceutical science (cand.pharm) 10 350 5.79
Veterinary science (cand.med.vet) 12 440 7.27
Educational science (cand.paed) 13 107 1.77
N 6,044 100
years), whereas students in the control group are equally divided across 12 and 10 semester
programs.
74 percent of the students in our sample spent more time in the higher education system
than the stipulated length of the education program. In Figure 1 we show how graduation on
time changed over time from 1988 to 1998 separately for the treatment and the control group.
During the whole period, the fraction of students completing their studies on time is higher
in the control group than in the treatment group. The fraction of students completing their
studies on time rose in the treatment group during the reform period (autumn 1991 - autumn
1995). In contrast, the control group is associated with a downward trend in the same period.
Both before and after the reform both groups follow a similar pattern.
Around 80 percent of the students in in our sample were already enrolled in higher education
programs when the reform was implemented. This is reported in Table 2. In the same table
we also see that approximately 11 percent of the students were enrolled 1 and 2 years prior to
the reform, etc.
In Appendix Table 6 we present the main descriptive statistics for our ￿nal sample.





























































1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Graduation year
Control group
Table 2: Nr of years enrolled in higher education before the implementation of the reform










We start out by assuming that the e￿ect of the reform on graduation on time can be estimated
by the following di￿erence-in-di￿erence equation:
yit =  + Dit1 + dt + T
UT
it + 1(Di  d
T




it ) + Xi + "it (1)
where Dit1 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for individuals belonging to the treatment
group, dt is a vector of dummy variables for year of graduation, T UT
it is the time from ￿rst
enrollment to implementation of the reform, dT
t is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the
individual graduated during the treatment period (i.e. the period during which the students
knew about the reform and were treated, autumn semester 1991 to autumn semester 1995), Xi
is a vector consisting of the control variables (dummy variables for age, gender and the length
of the study program - i.e. the number of semesters ranging from 10 to 13 semesters, as well
as parental education and immigrant status) described in the appendix in Table 6, and "it is
a random error term. Our parameters of interest are the di￿erence-in-di￿erence parameters 1
and 2. These measure the e￿ect of the incentive on whether the student completed on time. 1
measures the reform e￿ect on students who are fully treated, i.e. who were aware of the reform
from the start of their studies and also graduated under the reform. Note that only 4.5 years
passed from the reform was introduced before it was discontinued. Thus, few if any students
will be fully treated and the estimated e￿ect for the fully treated will involve an extrapolation.
We expect students who were only partly treated - i.e. who started studying before the
reform, but graduated during the the reform period - to show a smaller response to the reform.
Some students may already have been delayed without opportunity to catch up prior to the
reform, such that they would never be eligible for a restitution, and thus the reform had no
direct e￿ect on these students. We capture this by letting the reform e￿ect decrease linearly
with time from enrollment to reform. The reform e￿ect for a partly treated student will thus
be 1+2T UT
it , with 2 expected to be negative. Note that although we model this probability
as linear in T UT
it it need not be proportional. It may for example be the case that delays most
often occur during the last few years studying. In that case there may be a large change in the
probability of completion on time by going from not treated at all to being treated one or two
11years, but a smaller change by going from treated two years to treated three or four years. In
Eq. (1) this will be re￿ected as 1 >  2  T
UT;MAX
it , where T
UT;MAX
it is the highest value of
T UT
it (about six years).
Although our main focus will be on estimating Eq. (1), we will also presents results from a
simpler speci￿cation, disregarding time spent untreated:
yit =  + Dit1 + dt + (Di  d
T
t ) + Xi + "it (2)
In this speci￿cation our parameter of interest is the di￿erence-in-di￿erence parameter . This
parameter is the average change in yit in the treatment group over the course of the reform
period, minus the average change in yit in the control group over the same time period. Thus,
with this speci￿cation we estimate the total reform e￿ect during the reform period, 10 pooling
students with di￿erent time spent studying before the reform.
We will also estimate a more general speci￿cation than Eq. (1):
yit =  + Dit1 + dt + T
UT




it ) + Xi + "it (3)
In this speci￿cation we replace the di￿erence-in-di￿erence parameter 1 with a vector of year-
speci￿c parameters ~ 1;t. Thus, the reform e￿ect for a student that graduates in year t, and
have studied T UT
it years before the implementation of the reform is given as ~ 1;t + 2  T UT
it .
Note that the ￿rst term varies with year of graduation, while the parameter in the second
term, a term which is meant to capture the e￿ect of delays that have already occurred at the
time of implementation, is assumed constant. The reason for introducing this more general
speci￿cation are as follows. First, within the reform period it allows us to study the dynamics
of the introduction of the reform, e.g. to capture how information of the reform spread, or
non-linearities in the e￿ect of time untreated. Second, it allows us to introduce ￿placebo tests￿
outside of the reform period, as a robustness check for our ￿ndings. If we ￿nd a signi￿cant
(placebo) ￿reform e￿ect￿ before the introduction of the reform, this may be an indication
that what our estimates pick up is not really a reform e￿ect, but rather something else, e.g.
di￿erential trends in the share that graduated on time.
We can also not rule out persistent e￿ect after the reversal of the reform. Similarly to some
10There may also be a reform e￿ect after the reform period, see below for a discussion.
12students being partly treated at the end of their studies, there will be some who are partly
treated at the beginning of their studies, i.e. students who study during the reform period, but
who graduate after its end. Unless they expect the reform to be discontinued, these students
may adapt their behavior during the reform period, and thus have a lower probability of being
delayed. If this is the case we should expect to see some continued reform e￿ect after the end
of the reform period. Also, the reform may have a lasting in￿uence if the share completing
on time changes, and this in turn in￿uences the norms or preferences for completing on time.
However, as there should also be a direct e￿ect of the incentive, we would expect any estimated
e￿ect after the reversal of the reform to be smaller than the estimated e￿ect during the reform
period.
5 Results
The di￿erence-in-di￿erence estimates from Eq.(1) and Eq.(2) are reported in Table 3. The
table includes 3 speci￿cations. The ￿rst column reports the estimates of the simplest model
based on Eq.(2), whereas the second and third speci￿cations (column (2) and (3)), are based
on Eq.(1). The di￿erence between the second and third speci￿cation is that we in the latter
include control variables for students’ background.
As can be seen from column (1), the average e￿ect of the reform amounts to 2 percentage
points which corresponds to a 10 percent increase in the number of students graduating on
time. This average e￿ect does not distinguish between fully treated students (students who
were aware of the reform from the start of their studies) and partly treated students (students
who were enrolled in higher education one or more years before the implementation of the
reform and only had limited possibility to adjust their behavior).
Columns (2) and (3) present results where we control for time untreated while studying. In
these speci￿cations the di￿erence-in-di￿erence parameter has the interpretation of the expected
reform e￿ect on a fully treated student. The reform is estimated to increase the probability of
a fully treated student of graduating on time by 13 percentage points, which translates to a 50
percent increase in the number of students graduating on time. Also, this e￿ects is similar to the
baseline di￿erence in completion on time between the reform and control groups (conditional
on length of the program and years enrolled prior to the reform). Thus, a fully treated student
13Table 3: The e￿ect of ￿nancial incentives on graduating on time, estimated by OLS
Spec1 Spec 2 Spec 3
Treatment Group -0.164 (0.009)*** -0.145 (0.009)*** -0.147 (0.009)***
In Treatment 0.024 (0.011)** 0.132 (0.017)*** 0.132 (0.017)***
Years enrolled prior to reform -0.067 (0.002)*** -0.067 (0.002)***
Years enrolled prior to reform*In Treatment -0.021 (0.003)*** -0.021 (0.003)***
Length of ed program (10 = ref)
-11 semesters -0.511 (0.011)*** -0.454 (0.011)*** -0.455 (0.011)***
-12 semesters -0.393 (0.010)*** -0.304 (0.010)*** -0.300 (0.010)***
-13 semesters -0.575 (0.012)*** -0.419 (0.012)*** -0.413 (0.013)***
Male 0.027 (0.005)***
Mothers’ ed (ref = up sec basic, 11-12 years)
-<=Low sec (0-10 years) -0.001 (0.007)
-Up sec, ￿nal or post-sec, non-tert (13-14 years) -0.009 (0.008)
-Tertiary ed, undergrad lev (14-17) -0.005 (0.006)
->=Tertiary ed, grad lev (18-20+) -0.015 (0.012)
-Missing inf 0.009 (0.022)
Fathers’ ed (ref = up sec basic. 11-12 years)
-<=Low sec (0-10 years) 0.002 (0.009)
-Up sec, ￿nal or post-sec, non-tert (13-14 years) -0.015 (0.007)**
-Tertiary ed, undergrad lev (14-17) -0.011 (0.007)
->=Tertiary ed, grad lev (18-20+) -0.033 (0.007)***




-Norwegian-born to immigrant parents -0.012 (0.042)
-Foreign-born with one Norwegian-born parent -0.018 (0.021)
-Norwegian-born with one foreign-born parent -0.022 (0.010)**
-Foreign-born to Norwegian-born parents -0.024 (0.016)
-Missing information 0.002 (0.035)
R-square 0.202 0.280 0.283
N 26871 26871 26871
Note: Included in all speci￿cations are a constant term, dummy variables for graduation year
and dummy variables for length of study program. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity
robust. */**/*** statistically signi￿cance at the 10/5/1 percent level.
14in the treatment group is expected to have a similar probability of completing on time as an
otherwise similar student in the control group.
A likely reason for the discrepancy between the average e￿ect in column (1) and the e￿ect
for a fully treated student in columns (2) and (3) is, as already pointed out, that students who
enrolled in study programs before the reform may already be delayed in their study progression
and hence cannot respond directly to the new incentive. We ￿nd that for each year enrolled in
the higher education system prior to the reform, the chance of graduating on time is reduced
by 2 percent points.
Controlling for gender and background variables does not change the di￿-in-di￿ estimates.
This is also an indication that also also unobservable individual characteristics are not correlated
with being in the treatment group during the reform period. Note further that students enrolled
in 10 semester programs have a higher chance to graduate on time relative to students in longer
study programs. This ￿nding is also stable across the model speci￿cations. The correlations
between the remaining control variables and the probability of graduating on time are mostly
statistically insigni￿cant. One exception is that male students have a 3 percentage points higher
probability to graduate on time than female students.
In addition to an e￿ect of time untreated, it may be that the reform e￿ect will change
during the reform period as students grow more accustomed to the reform, and possibly align
their behavior and norms with the reform’s intention. In order to test this assumption we
present the year-speci￿c di￿erence-in-di￿erence estimates in Table 4. We ￿nd indications of
an increasing reform e￿ect. The fraction of students completing their studies on nominal time
increases (almost) for each year. An alternative interpretation of this ￿nding may be that the
year-speci￿c reform e￿ects control for non-linearities in the relationship between time untreated
and probability of graduation on time. If this is the case, the ￿ndings corresponds to an e￿ect
of the reform that increase more than linearly with time treated. Thus, it implies that it is
particularly important that treatment starts early, consistent with a hypothesis that study
habits matter.
With di￿erence-in-di￿erence studies there is always a concern that the estimate is picking
up di￿erential time trends or other shocks. To check the robustness of the reform e￿ect,
we investigate the trends in study duration both before and after the reform period for the
15Table 4: Year-speci￿c di￿erence in di￿erence variables
Spec 4 Spec 5
Treatment Group -0.148 (0.010)*** -0.149 (0.010)***
In Treatment 1991 0.018 (0.021) 0.016 (0.021)
In Treatment 1992 0.092 (0.023)*** 0.094 (0.023)***
In Treatment 1993 0.119 (0.023)*** 0.119 (0.023)***
In Treatment 1994 0.116 (0.023)*** 0.116 (0.023)***
In Treatment 1995 0.136 (0.023)*** 0.135 (0.023)***
Years enrolled prior to reform -0.070 (0.002)*** -0.070 (0.002)***
Years enrolled prior to reform*In Treatment -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.013 (0.002)***
Length of ed program (10 = ref)
-11 semesters -0.450 (0.011)*** -0.451 (0.011)***
-12 semesters -0.300 (0.010)*** -0.297 (0.010)***
-13 semesters -0.415 (0.013)*** -0.408 (0.013)***
Male 0.027 (0.005)***
Controlling for parental background No Yes
R-square 0.280 0.283
N 26871 26871
Note: See Table 3
treatment and control groups. We do this by estimating placebo reform ￿e￿ects￿ for each year
1988-1998. Table 5 shows that we do ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant reform e￿ect for most of the
reform years (except the year of introduction, 1991), and that we do not ￿nd any signi￿cantly
positive e￿ects in any of the other years. 11
In particular, we would be concerned about an estimated positive reform ￿e￿ect￿ in the years
before the introduction of the reform. However, the estimates indicate a somewhat negative
￿e￿ect￿ in the period before the reform. This suggests that what we have captured is a pure
reform e￿ect and hence no e￿ect of di￿erential time trends. We do ￿nd some signs of positive
- if insigni￿cant - e￿ects after the reform is discontinued. 12 As discussed in Section 4, this may
be weak evidence for some kind of spillover or lasting e￿ect of the reform.
11Note that in Tables 3 and 4 the reform e￿ect is estimated relative to the years 1988-1990 and 1996-1998.
In Table 5 all e￿ects are relative to 1989, the last year before the introduction of the reform. As di￿erences in
completion rates between the treatment and comparison groups varies randomly over time, this in￿uence the
values of the estimated coe￿cients on the reform variables. However, the di￿erence between any of the reform
coe￿cients is una￿ected.
12In particular if we compare to an average of the pre-reform years, rather than just 1989.
16Table 5: Placebo Testing
Spec 6 Spec 7
Treatment Group -0.122 (0.020)*** -0.124 (0.020)***
In Treatment 1988 -0.070 (0.029)** -0.071 (0.029)**
In Treatment 1990 -0.080 (0.028)*** -0.080 (0.028)***
In Treatment 1991 -0.008 (0.028) -0.009 (0.028)
In Treatment 1992 0.066 (0.029)** 0.068 (0.029)**
In Treatment 1993 0.093 (0.029)*** 0.093 (0.029)***
In Treatment 1994 0.091 (0.029)*** 0.091 (0.029)***
In Treatment 1995 0.110 (0.029)*** 0.109 (0.029)***
In Treatment 1996 0.013 (0.028) 0.012 (0.028)
In Treatment 1997 -0.035 (0.028) -0.034 (0.028)
In Treatment 1998 0.013 (0.030) 0.015 (0.030)
Years enrolled prior to reform -0.070 (0.002)*** -0.071 (0.002)***
Years enrolled prior to reform*In Treatment -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.013 (0.002)***
Length of study program (10 = ref)
-11 semesters -0.450 (0.011)*** -0.452 (0.011)***
-12 semesters -0.302 (0.010)*** -0.298 (0.010)***
-13 semesters -0.415 (0.013)*** -0.409 (0.013)***
Male 0.027 (0.005)***
Controlling for parental background No Yes
R-square 0.281 0.283
N 26871 26871
Note: See Table 3
175.1 Design of the reform incentive and heterogeneous e￿ects
The average incentive e￿ect on fully treated students is estimated to be very strong. However,
the reaction to such an incentive is neither empirically nor theoretically straightforward. The
extent to which a student responds to the incentive will naturally depend on how it is designed.
Building on incentive theory, we know for instance that incentives are more likely to be e￿ective
when the award standards are more short terms, i.e. comes more quickly, perhaps at the end
of every term, and not after more than ￿ve years as in our case (Holmstr￿m and Milgrom,
1987). In addition, the form taken by the subsidy itself - no direct cash reward, but only a
relatively small loan reduction (where the remaining part is going to be repaid and discounted
over several years) - might feel like a very low powered incentive.
That we despite these theoretical considerations do ￿nd quite strong e￿ects indicates that
students are quite responsive to ￿nancial incentives. One reason may be that students in
general are quite constrained ￿nancially. Another possibility is that the educational outcome
being incentivized - the nominal study duration- is something that the students can easily
adjust to without su￿ering too high e￿ort costs.
Although students on average seem to respond well to the incentive, the e￿ect may vary
across students due to for instance relative di￿erence in ￿nancial positions, academic prepa-
ration (e.g. Leuven et al., 2010), access to information, and the interactions of these factors.
However, we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant evidence that students of higher educated parents
respond di￿erently to the incentive than students of lower educated parents.
6 Conclusion
Ensuring equal opportunities in access of higher education a central aim of policy makers.
An important policy instrument in this regard has been state provided loans and grants for
students. However, as this support reduces the marginal cost of studying, it may have undesired
consequences in the form of reduced study e￿ciency. In this paper we investigate the e￿ects
on study duration of a reform that rewarded students who completed their higher education
degree on nominal time.
We ￿nd strong e￿ects of an incentive aiming at increased study e￿ciency. The number of
students that graduated on nominal time rose with about 10 percent. Thus, for 10 students
18given a restitution, one would otherwise not have graduated on nominal time. However, the
scope for the the reform was reduced by the fact that many students had a limited possibility
to adjust their behavior. The estimated e￿ect on a fully treated student, which corresponds
to the expected e￿ect of the incentive if it is in operation for a longer time, is much higher,
indicating an increase of 10 percentage points, i.e. 50 percent of the base probability or one
additional student graduating on time for every third restitution given.
This suggests that students respond strongly to ￿nancial incentives. The reason might be
that students in general are quite constrained ￿nancially and/or that students can quite easily
adjust their study duration. However, it is di￿cult to draw clear policy implications from our
￿ndings as we do not know the underlying mechanisms that are driving this result. Potential
mechanisms may include increased study intensity, for example by reducing part-time work, or
graduation with a smaller amounts of human capital, which could result in lower earnings after
graduation. Both may or may not be undesired, depending on the strengths of the e￿ects. To
distinguish between such potential mechanisms, and to investigate further consequences and
the desirability of the reform requires further research.
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21Table 6: Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample, reported are fractions
Students graduating on time (share) 0.265
Female (share) 0.511
Average age end of high school 19.1
Mother’s education (share)
-<=Low sec (0-10 years) 0.140
-Up sec basic, 11-12 years 0.370
-Up sec, ￿nal or post-sec, non-tert (13-14 years) 0.116
-Tertiary ed, undergrad lev (14-17) 0.302
->=Tertiary ed, grad lev (18-20+) 0.047
-Missing inf 0.026
Father’s education (share)
-<=Low sec (0-10 years) 0.100
-Up sec basic, 11-12 years 0.222
-Up sec, ￿nal or post-sec, non-tert (13-14 years) 0.163
-Tertiary ed, undergrad lev (14-17) 0.219
->=Tertiary ed, grad lev (18-20+) 0.260
-Missing inf 0.036
Immigrants 0.103
Total number of students 26,871
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